We use a simple information-based model of corporate investment to outline the conditions under which corporate investment is sensitive to cash flow. The key cross-sectional predictions of the model are that the investment is more sensitive to cash flow for firms with more informative stock prices, higher cash flow volatility and smaller divergence in opinions among their informed traders. Our model offers a market microstructure-based explanation on the investment-cash flow sensitivity other than the popular "financing constraint" hypothesis proposed by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) and the traditional Q theory.
Introduction
A recent puzzle in investment literature is that variables other than Tobin's Q (primarily, cash flow) enter empirical investment regressions significantly. This piece of evidence clearly contradicts the neoclassical investment theory which argues that marginal Q is a sufficient statistic for investment and no other variable should have a significant regression coefficient (see Tobin (1968) and Hayashi (1982) ). A large and still growing literature has been devoted to explaining the puzzle. The endeavors so far can be classified into two categories. First, the highly significant cash flow effect in investment equations has been interpreted as evidence supporting the existence of finance constraints, particularly for small firms (Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) (FHP thereafter) ; Hoshi, Kashyap, and Scharfstein (1991); and Whited (1992) , among others). Underlying this line of research is the premise that informational imperfections in equity and credit markets lead to a divergence between the costs of external and internal funds. Any difficulties a firm faces in obtaining outside funds may affect its real investment decisions. The second category of research confronts the above interpretation and adheres to the belief that marginal Q should be the sole determinant of investment behavior. Any deviation from it is either due to measurement error in Q or model mis-specifications. For example, using the same sample as that in Fazzari et al. (1988) , Kaplan and Zingales (1998) find that the investment-cash flow sensitivities do not increase monotonically with the degree of financing constraints.
1 Erickson and Whited (2000) document that after controlling for errors in measuring marginal Q, the explanatory power of cash flow becomes weaker and even disappears. They argue that the traditional Q theory explains corporate investment decisions well once measurement error is taken care of. Gomes (2001) analyzes the implications of the cost of external funds in a dynamic Q framework. His simulation results indicate that the existence of financial constraints is not a sufficient condition for investment-cash flow sensitivities. The same results are also found in Alti (2003) .
Given the body of conflicting empirical evidence, optimism towards either argument seems premature. Obviously, more research needs to be conducted to further clarify the role of cash flow in investment equations.
In this paper, we offer an innovative perspective on the sensitivity of investment to cash flow by focusing on a missing link in prior literature, namely, the information role of cash flow. In this context, shocks to cash flow carry important information about a firm's investment opportunities and the firm manager can leverage the information to make more effective investment decisions. The stock market is important in our model for two reasons:
first, the stock market provides an independent signal for the firm's future prospects; second, stock prices aggregate all relevant information, which should and could be leveraged by the manager. In general, the more informative the stock price is, the more information the manager can extract from cash flow. Consequently, investment is more responsive to cash flow.
Examples may help illuminate the intuition. Imagine that a packaged goods company is planning to enter a related but different product line through a series of acquisitions.
However, the market casts doubts on the company's capability to enter the new market. As a result, the market punishes the company's stock on news of the first acquisition. Observing the stock price movements and realizing the investors' concerns, the company adjusts its original strategic plan. Take a look at another example. A biotech company has the ability to pursue many strategic options based on their "scientific position" but the available resources only allow it to pursue a few. Traditional NPV analysis could not distinguish among options since assumptions could swing the decision. Therefore, the firm tries to extract as much information from the capital market as possible by asking the opinions of its important shareholders. Based on the input, the firm obtains a clearer understanding about how long it would take for investors to reward different strategic options and which investment is the most appropriate one.
To flesh out the above intuition, we consider an entrepreneur who has an established business and is developing a new product that will require additional capital. Following Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , we assume the payoff from the growth opportunity depends on the amount of capital invested and is correlated with the payoff to the asset in place. 2 In our model, when the manager makes the investment decision, she does not know the realization of cash flow. She needs to extract information contained in the cash flow from stock prices.
3 This is how stock trading behavior and price informativeness come into play in our model.
By creating a link between stock market and corporate investment, our model explicitly studies the role of stock prices in transmitting information from informed traders to the manager. Our model demonstrates that as stock prices become more informative, the manager would be able to extract more information from the cash flow, which leads to more responsive investment. The cross-sectional difference in investment-cash flow sensitivities thus reflects the differences in stock market microstructure and the amount of information inferred by the manager from the stock markets. By adopting the Kyle (1985) model and clearly assuming that the number of informed investors is endogenously determined, we find a positive relationship between the number of informed traders and the investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Several testable hypotheses can be derived from the model. It is first shown that firms with shares traded by a larger number of informed traders tend to have more sensitive investment and cash flow dependence. Our model then demonstrates that the investmentcash flow sensitivities are stronger for firms with a higher degree of cash flow volatility and for firms with a smaller degree of opinion divergence among informed traders. When we use 2 The correlation is due to the fact that the new project is in the same or adjacent industry as the existing assets. This is particularly so for newer, smaller, and faster-growing firms. These firms are still learning about their fundamentals. The realization of cash flow will presumably reveal relatively more information and provides a greater revision of expected profitability. We clearly consider this case in our model. 3 We assume that the capital market knows more about the payoffs to the firm's assets than the manager does for the following two reasons: (1) even though the manager may be better informed than any single investor, she is less likely to be better informed than all investors, whose separate information is aggregated into share price; and (2) part of the information may be economy-wide (e.g., macroeconomic shocks), over which the investors may have advantages compared to the firm manager.
analyst coverage as measures for informed traders, we find empirical evidence supporting the model. Though this paper is not the first one that pins on the importance of cash flow in predicting future profitability 4 , ours is the first that clearly models the information contained in cash flow in a market microstructure framework. Our paper shows that firm-specific characteristics in stock market microstructure set courses for a firm's stock prices, which subsequently determine the amount of information which is contained in cash flow and is leveraged by the manager. 5 Moreover, our paper offers a more comprehensive view on the cash flow effects in investment regressions. For example, we find that the volatility of cash flow and the divergence in cash flow forecasts all have an impact on a firm's real investment decision.
We have to be very careful in distinguishing our "information hypothesis" from the popular "financing constraint" hypothesis. One possibility is that the firms with more analyst coverage tend to be more financially constrained. We design two ways to distinguish the two hypotheses. First, we use the residual analyst coverage (after controlling for the firm-specific characteristics such as size, market-to-book ratio, turnover ratio and etc.) to sort the firms.
This approach enables us to resolve the endogeneity problem of using the number of analysts as an explanatory variable and also to take out the effect of financing constraint on our results.
Second, we divide the firms in our sample into low financing constraint, medium financing constraint, and high financing constraint groups according to a generalized Kaplan-Zingales index of financial constraints (the KZ index). For all three groups, we identify the same pattern: firms with more analysts following tend to have more sensitive investment-cash flow dependence. Obviously, in contrast to the "financing constraint" hypothesis, our model 4 Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995 ), Owen (1997 ), and Erickson and Whited (2000 make similar arguments, and in some cases, offer empirical support.
5 A recent paper by Durnev, Morck and Yeung (2001) illustrates that a firm can allocate capital with greater precision when its stock prices track the fundamentals more closely. It carries the same spirit as ours. However, it does not consider the information role played by cash flow about future investment, therefore, it does not address the relation between stock price informativeness and investment-cash flow sensitivity.
presents another determinant that explains investment-cash flow sensitivity.
The Microsoft example used in Kaplan and Zingales (2000) fits well in our model. Microsoft had a very high sensitivity between investment and cash flow over the period from 1986 to 1997. Given Microsoft's extraordinarily strong financial position -no debt and almost $9 billion in cash in 1997, it is hard to believe that the "financing constraint" theory could find any room here. Meanwhile, due to a high level of inside ownership, it is also unlikely that the sensitive investment-cash flow correlation is an embodiment of serious agency problems at Microsoft. However, the information-based theory offered in the paper explains the puzzle well: the high investment-cash flow sensitivities reflect Microsoft's highly informative stock prices, as a result of extensive analyst coverage.
Our model also departs from the neoclassical investment theory. Our model clearly shows that cash flow can be significant in investment regressions even in the presence of Tobin's Q.
The significance of cash flow results from the information on future prospects contained in cash flow and it will not go away even with a perfect measure for Tobin's Q included in the regressions. Therefore, unlike Erickson and Whited (2000) , Gomes (2001) and Alti (2003) , our model shows that measurement error in Tobin's Q is not the driver of significant cash flow effect in investment. Even though Tobin's Q perfectly measures the investment opportunities of a firm, cash flow can still be significant in the investment equation simply because it carries the information about investment opportunities too. Moreover, by shifting the focus to stock trading and stock market efficiency, our model finds that the cross-sectional difference in cash flow investment sensitivities is highly related to the stock price informativeness. The result is particularly valuable given the existence of a large literature that emphasizes the irrational elements contained in stock prices (see Keynes (1936); Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1990), and Stein (1996) ).
In a different setting, Baker et al. (2003) study the sensitivity of investment to stock prices. They find that investment is more responsive to stock prices for equity-dependent firms where the degree of equity dependence is measured based on the KZ index. Although their paper, as ours, suggests a specific mechanism through which market inefficiency may affect the investment (equity dependence vs. stock price informativeness in ours), there are several differences in the two papers. First, cash flow is the focus of our paper. Our model brings the cash flow's information role to test through a market microstructure channel. In contrast, Baker et al. (2003) have more focus on investment-Q correlation. Second, our model generates several empirical implications not covered by their paper. For example, we find that investment-cash flow sensitivity increases with cash flow volatility and decreases with the error of earnings forecast, which have not been studied in prior literature including Baker et al. (2003) . Having said that, we still believe the two papers are spiritually related since both suggest that capital market inefficiency may affect a firm's real decisions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 offers a simple informationbased model to explain the cross-sectional variations in investment-cash flow sensitivity.
Section 3 discusses the data and the sample; Section 4 presents the empirical results. Section 5 concludes.
A Simple Model

the economic setting
We consider a single firm that consists of an asset in place and a growth opportunity. Let us assume that the terminal payoff from the asset is given byr = r + δ, where r is the ex ante mean and δ is a zero-mean, normally distributed random variable with variances, V δ . Obviously, δ may reflect either the economy-wide or firm-specific shocks. A potential investor can become informed by collecting information about δ.
Assume that the payoff from the growth opportunity is given by I + Kδ − 0.5K 2 , where I is a positive constant and K is the capital the firm invests. Clearly, payoff from the new investment relies on the cash flow from the asset in place, r + δ, 6 through the realization of cash flow. Such learning and readjusting tends to have a significant influence on the firm's investment. Also note that we assume the payoff from the growth opportunity is a quadratic function of investment, K. It is consistent with a large literature in Macroeconomics that clearly adopts quadratic investment adjustment cost functions. Such an arrangement yields a linear relationship between the rate of investment and the random shock, δ, and makes our analysis tractable without losing much economics intuition.
Following the setup laid out in Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , we assume that a firm issues the shares on the cash flow to the firm's asset in place rather than on the cash flow to the whole firm (including cash flow to the new investment project). This assumption simplifies our analysis dramatically and has no substantive effect on the results because there is a deterministic relation in this model between the cash flow to the asset and the cash flow to the investment project. The price of a claim on the firm's asset in place provides the same amount of information about the optimal investment as would the price of a claim on the entire firm. But we know from the above that the cash flow to the entire firm would not be normally distributed, which precludes the possibility of obtaining a closed-form solution to the security market equilibrium in a model where a claim on the firm's total cash flow is sold.
The manager knows the distribution, but not the exact realization of δ. 7 However, she can extract imperfect information about δ through observing the price of the public claim the firm issues. Therefore, investment efficiency depends on the informativeness of stock prices. As in Holmstrom and Tirole (1993) , and Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) 
Stock market equilibrium and investment-cash sensitivity
Following Subrahmanyam and Titman (1999) , we adopt a model with many potential riskneutral traders and a competitive risk-neutral market maker. Each trader, after she decides to trade, submits a market order to the market maker. Also, we assume the total liquidity demand in the market is given by z and z is a zero-mean, normally distributed variable with variance, V z . The market maker, after observing the total order flow, sets a price that is a function of the total (net) order flow so that her expected profit conditional on the total order flow is zero.
Assume for now that there are N traders who actively search for information on δ and trade on the stock. As in Kyle (1985) , agent i submits an order, β(δ + i ). Since there are N agents and z liquidity demand, the total order flow observed by the market maker is given
The market maker, after observing the total order flow, ω, sets a price schedule of the form P = r + λω. Using standard techniques, we obtain the following lemma.
Lemma 1: In equilibrium, the value of λ is given by
8 µ may vary across firms.
where
(2)
Proof of Lemma 1: Let the order of a particular trader i with costly information δ + i be denoted by x. This informed trader maximizes
Assume that all N informed traders follow the same strategy and submit the order in the form β(δ + i ), then equation (3) becomes
Solving out the first order condition, we find that x is given in the form β(δ + i ), where
By assuming that β is the same across all informed traders, the symmetric Nash equilibrium could be solved from equation (5), so we have
Since P = r + λω = r + E(δ|ω), and λ is the coefficient in the regression of δ on ω,
i + z into the above expression for λ and in turn, substituting for β from equation (6) gives
, we have equation (1) in the text. Q.E.D. Note that in the above expression, λ captures stock market depth. It increases with V δ .
The intuition is that as the variance of the information signal increases, the information becomes more valuable. This, in turn, makes the market less liquid since the uninformed traders will try to stay away from the market. Also note that Γ is decreasing in N if and only if
Throughout the paper, we assume that this condition is satisfied.
By using the standard techniques, it is easy to show that the expected profit of informed traders given that they observe the private signal about δ is given as
Clearly, a potential trader will make an effort to search for the private signal and actively trade if and only if the expected profit from doing so, Π, exceeds her reservation value, µ.
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Therefore, the equilibrium number of informed traders, N , is determined by
It is easy to prove that the number of informed traders, N , is a decreasing function of the reservation value, µ. N also increases with V δ , but decreases with V .
Up to now, we have plotted out the stock market equilibrium in our model. We will next move to study how the investment-cash flow sensitivities respond to the stock price informativeness. We have the following proposition.
Proposition 1: The sensitivity of investment K to the firm's cash flowr, ρ, is given by
Proof: Since the firm can only infer the information concerning δ from the stock price, the firm chooses optimal capital investment, K, to maximize its profits. Its problem can be simply written as
Let µ δ = E(δ|P ). The first order condition yields
The correlation coefficient between investment and cash flow, ρ, therefore, could be written
Simply, we have µ δ = E(δ|P ) = P − r = λω. Inserting it into equation (14), we have
Plugging equations (1) and (2) into equation (15), we obtain equation (11). Q.E.D.
Several interesting implications can be derived from equation (11). Specifically, we have the following:
Proposition 2: The investment-cash flow sensitivity, ρ, increases with the number of informed traders, N .
Proof: From equation (11), we have
However, N in our model is an endogenous variable. It depends on the investor's reservation value of becoming an informed trader, µ, and several other exogenous factors such as V δ and V . We can derive a series of investment-cash flow sensitivity results as follows. In addition, from equation (11), we know
Since
Lastly, from (11), we know
The numerator of the above expression is negative since ∂N ∂V < 0. Therefore, we have ∂ρ ∂V < 0.
Q.E.D.
empirical implications
Several empirical implications can be derived from Propositions 1-3. If we use the number of financial analysts following a certain firm as a measure for the number of informed traders, N, we obtain:
Hypothesis 1: The more analysts follow a certain firm, the larger is the regression coefficient of corporate investment on cash flow.
Proposition 3 shows that the investment-cash flow sensitivities are eventually driven by various exogenous variables such as µ, V δ , and V . Unfortunately, we do not have a good measure for the information cost (or the reservation value of obtaining information), µ.
Therefore, we cannot directly test the relationship between the investment-cash flow sensitivity and µ. Fortunately, we are able to construct reliable measures for both V δ and V . We compute the cash flow volatility based on a firm's quarterly disclosure or by using the stock return volatility as a proxy. Following accounting literature, we construct a measure for V using the standard deviation of analyst forecasts. Thus, we can test hypotheses related to these two exogenous variables. Proposition 3 shows that the investment-cash flow sensitivity, ρ, increases with the variance of a firm's cash flow (V δ ). Intuitively, larger V δ implies that information contained in the cash flow would be more valuable to investors, which provides the investors with incentive to become informed. As a result, the stock prices become more informative and the investment becomes more responsive to the cash flow. We thus obtain:
Hypothesis 2: The higher the cash flow volatility, the larger the regression coef-ficient of corporate investment on cash flow.
Proposition 3 also predicts that there is a negative correlation between investment-cash flow sensitivity, ρ, and the variance of the private signal observed by informed traders, V . In other words, the larger the divergence in analyst forecasts, the less sensitive the relationship between investment and cash flow. Obviously, when informed traders do not agree with each other on a firm's fundamentals, their trading activities become less informative. There is less information in the stock prices that could be leveraged by the manager. Therefore, the investment-cash flow sensitivities become weaker. We have Hypothesis 3: When the degree of dispersion among informed traders increases, the investment-cash flow sensitivities tend to decrease.
Data
We describe in this section the data and the empirical method employed to bring the model to test. We use the data from Compustat and I/B/E/S database during the period from 1985 to 2001 to establish our sample and construct relevant variables. For the data extracted from Compustat, we exclude financial firms (i.e., firms with a one-digit SIC code of 6). We measure a firm's investment (capital expenditures) using Compustat data item 128. The firm's cash flow is measured as the sum of earnings before extraordinary items (item 18) and depreciation (item 14). We scale our measures of investment and cash flow by last year's capital stock, which is defined as the net property, plant, and equipment (item 8 from Compustat). We then follow common practice and measure a firm's average Tobin's Q as the ratio of the market value of assets to their book value (item 6), where the market value of assets is defined as the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the book value of common equity (item 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (item 74).
10
Panel A of Table 1 shows the summary statistics of variables constructed from Compustat:
10 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) use the same measure for Tobin's Q. They argue that the improvements obtained from more involved computation of Q are fairly limited.
capital investment, Tobin's Q and cash flow. We truncate the sample at 1% and 99% levels to exclude outliers with extreme values in cash flow, Tobin's Q or capital expenditures.
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There are in total 53,904 firm year observations in our sample. During the period from 1985 to 2001, the mean (median) deflated capital investment, Tobin's Q and cash flow are 0.33 (0.22), 1.69 (1.28) and 0.69 (0.39) respectively. After we split the whole time period further into three time periods, 1985-1990, 1991-1995 and 1996-2001 , we find that the means and medians for the three key variables are fairly stable over time.
In empirical tests, we employ the financial analyst forecasts database to construct variables concerning informed traders' trading activities. It has been argued and well-accepted that that an increase in the number of analysts following a given stock will greatly improve the speed of information (both market-wide and firm specific) transmission and the informativeness of stock prices (see Brennan and Hughs (1991), Brennan, Jegadeesh and Swaminathan (1993) and Hong, Lim and Stein (2000)).
12 We obtain the data on analyst coverage from the I/B/E/S Historical Summary File. For each year, we specify the number of analysts following as the number of analysts in the I/B/E/S database who provide the fiscal year 1 forecasts in the 8th month of the current fiscal year (the I/B/E/S forecast period indicator is set to 1).
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We define the forecast error as the absolute value of the difference between median forecast and the actual EPS divided by the actual EPS. We compute the price adjusted forecast error by dividing the forecast error with last month's close price. In addition, we define a variable, SDD, which aims to capture the divergence of analysts' opinions, or the degree of dispersion among informed traders. It is the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts divided by the mean forecast.
11 We conduct a variety of robustness checks to determine whether adding outliers makes any difference. As it turns out, all that matters is that we exclude several observations with the most extreme realizations in Tobin's Q and corporate investment. Truncating the sample at the 0.5% and 99.5% levels yields the same results.
12 The number of analysts has also been used as a proxy for the number of informed traders in above studies.
13 The results based on the forecasts made in other months are very similar. Throughout the paper, we only consider the forecasts made in the 8th month of the current fiscal year. Table 1 reports the summary statistics of these forecast variables. When we present the summary statistics, we also divide the firms into two groups: multi-segment firms and stand-alone firms. The idea is to see whether there is certain difference between the two groups. Clearly, the two groups of firms display different analyst forecasting activities.
Panel B of
Slightly fewer multi-segment firms are covered by financial analysts (54.9% versus 57.1%).
The average forecast error tends to be smaller for multi-segment firms. However, the analysts show larger divergence in their forecasts about multi-segment firms (median SDD: 0.034 versus 0.032). 
where dummy = 1 if the observation is from the first group and 0 otherwise. We then test whether c and d are statistically significant. It turns out that the differences in coefficients between the two groups are significant at the 1% level for both cash flow and Tobin's Q, which strongly supports Proposition 2. To sum up, results in Panel A show that firms with analysts following demonstrate a more sensitive investment-cash flow relationship than other
15 For firm year observations without matching records in the I/B/E/S database, we assume there is no analyst following, as does the literature.
16 Note that in all regressions, we also add industry(based on two-digit SIC codes) and year dummies. For brevity, we don't report them in tables. Results are available upon request.
17 We control for the year effect by adding year dummies.
firms.
In order to fix the possible serial correlations among investment and cash flow, we follow the methodology suggested in Fama and MacBeth (1973) and apply it to all regressions.
We first run a cross-section regression of investment on cash flow and Table 2 are consistent with Hypothesis 1: the sensitivity between investment and cash flow is higher for firms with more analyst coverage.
Sorting Firms By Residual Analyst Coverage
However, using analyst coverage data as measures for informed traders may be problematic.
As documented by Bhushan (1989) , the extent of analyst coverage depends on several firm characteristics that proxy for the cost of information acquisition. Hence, firm characteristics, which affect the demand and supply for information acquisition, are determinants of the number of analysts following a certain firm. The literature has identified firm size, the number of segments, market-to-book ratio, and turnover ratio as the key factors. Obviously, if we study investment-cash flow sensitivity and analyst coverage without clearly controlling for those firm characteristics, the results may be misleading.
Following Hong, Lim and Stein (1999), we regress log(1+N) against the firm specific variables such as log(size), market-to-book ratio, turnover ratio, number of segments, Nasdaq dummy, industry dummies and year dummies. Consistent with the literature, we find that firm size is the most dominant variable among all. Intuitively, large firms tend to be covered by more analysts. Market-to-book ratio is significantly negative. Firms with higher marketto-book ratio usually have less analyst coverage, which implies that the analysts are more willing to follow value stocks rather than growth stocks. The result makes sense given the fact that value stocks may hide more unexplored information and trading them, therefore, is potentially more profitable. The coefficient on turnover ratio is also positive and significant.
The estimated coefficient on the number of segments is negative and significant. Analysts will have to make more effort and incur more costs in following a typical multi-segment firm than in following a single-segment firm. The cost of information acquisition increases in the line of business, which results in less analyst coverage everything else being equal.
The coefficient on the NASDAQ dummy is positive, indicating that firms traded on the NASDAQ have more analyst coverage than firms traded on NYSE/AMSE. To better focus on testing our model implications, we choose not to report those results in tables. But they are available upon request.
After controlling for these firm-specific characteristics, we compute for each observation the residual coverage as the residual from the above specified linear regression. Residual coverage is the part of analyst coverage that is orthogonal to firm characteristics. Sorting firms by residual coverage, we exclude the possibility that the detected relation between analyst coverage and investment-cash flow sensitivity is due to the fact that they are both correlated to some common firm characteristics.
Based on the residuals, we split the samples into three sub-sample evenly: low residual coverage, medium residual coverage and high residual coverage, respectively. Our model predicts that firms with higher residual coverage have more informed traders trading their stocks, therefore, they have more information contained in cash flow. For each sub-sample, we regress firms' investment against Tobin's Q, cash flow, industry dummies and year dummies.
Panel A of Table 3 reports the OLS results. The cash flow coefficients for low, medium and high coverage groups are 0.137, 0.148 and 0.163, respectively. There is a clear monotonic relationship between the cash flow coefficient and the level of residual coverage. The economic effect is significant too. This is consistent with the primary prediction of our model: more informed stock prices lead to a more sensitive investment-cash flow relationship.
In Panel B of Table 3 , we report the results by using the Fama-MacBeth method to control for the potential serial correlations in investment and cash flow. The results are the same: as the residual analyst coverage increases, the firm's investment becomes more responsive to the cash flow.
We then add two interactive variables to the baseline regression: residual coverage*Tobin's Q and residual coverage*cash flow. If firms with more informed traders (captured by residual coverage) do demonstrate a more sensitive investment-cash flow relationship, we expect the coefficient of the residual coverage -cash flow interaction to be significantly positive.
We run the investment regression against the whole sample that consists of 40,960 observations. Panel C presents the results. The first column of Panel C reports the OLS results.
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Strikingly, the coefficient of residual * CF t /K t−1 is significantly positive (t-statistic=10.83).
Using the Fama-MacBeth method (presented in Column 2) yields the same results.
Sorting firms by cash flow volatility
Hypothesis 2 predicts that the investment-cash flow sensitivity, ρ, increases a firm's cash flow volatility, V δ . As the variance of cash flow (V δ ) increases, the information collected by informed traders becomes more valuable. Therefore, its impact on a firm's investment decision will be more significant, which leads to a sensitive relationship between investment and cash flow.
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In this subsection, we empirically test this hypothesis. We use two measures for a firm's cash flow volatility to ensure the robustness of our empirical results. We first use quarterly data from Compustat. For each firm year observation, we calculate the standard deviation of the last two years' quarterly cash flows (8 observations). We then normalize it by the average quarterly cash flow and use it as a proxy for cash flow volatility.
We create two interactive variables (cash flow volatility*Tobin's Q and cash flow volatility*cash flow) and add them to the baseline model. Panel A of (1993) , the following regression is run for each stock:
where R m,t is the overall market return at time t, SM B t measures the performance of small stocks relative to big stocks (small minus big) and HM L t measures the performance of value stocks relative to growth stocks (high minus low). The Fama-French three factors capture the common risks that affect all stocks. However, the volatility of an individual firm's cash flow is mainly captured by a firm's individual risk. We therefore compute the variance of residuals from (21) and use it as the proxy for a firm's cash flow volatility, V δ .
We apply the residual variance from year t-1 in our test. 20 As in Panel A, we construct two interaction terms: volatility* cash flow and volatility*Tobin's Q. After we add them to the baseline model, we find that both interactive variables are significantly positive. Panel B
of Table 4 presents both the OLS and the Fama-MacBeth regression results. In both cases, the coefficients for cash flow volatility* cash flow are significantly positive, which implies that higher cash flow volatility indeed is correlated to a more sensitive investment-cash flow relationship.
Sorting Firms by the variance of analyst forecasts
Another empirical implication from our model is that the variance of the private signals observed by informed traders negatively affects a firm's investment-cash flow sensitivity. Similarly, we construct two interactive variables: normalized standard deviation (SDD)* Tobin's Q and SDD*cash flow. We add the two interactive variables to the baseline model. Table 5 presents the results of both the OLS and the Fama-MacBeth regression methods.
When applying OLS, we find that the coefficient of SDD*cash flow is significantly negative (t statistic = -2.63), which confirms our model prediction. The Fama-MacBeth method yields an insignificant result but the sign is negative. Overall, the empirical evidence provides weak support for Hypothesis 3.
further discussion 4.4.1 robustness check
The empirical evidences established so far clearly support our information-based investment model. In order to test the robustness of our results, we also try several alternative specifications of our model. First, we apply a different definition of investment. We use data item 30 instead of data item 128 to run all the regressions and find the results are very similar to what we obtained before. Second, we try to deflate investment and cash flow with a firm's total sales instead of total assets. The results are qualitatively the same. Third, we adjust the ways we truncate the sample to check robustness. We find that our main results stand as long as we exclude several observations with the most extreme realizations in cash flow, Tobin's Q or investment. Our results are not driven by outliers.
Is the evidence consistent with the "financing constraint hypothesis"?
Robust as it is, there is still a need to distinguish our model from other explanations. FHP attributes the investment-cash flow sensitivities to financing constraints facing a firm. They argue that firms with financing constraints are more likely to face a larger wedge between the internal and the external cost of funds and, therefore, have greater investment-cash flow sensitivities. Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein (1991) follow the same spirit and find that investment by Japanese firms that belong to a keiretsu (corporate group) is less sensitive to cash flow than that by independent firms. They conclude that a group affiliation alleviates liquidity problems caused by capital market imperfection. In contrast, our model offers a different perspective. It is therefore interesting to see whether the results derived from our model still hold for a sample of firms with financing constraints.
Using results from Kaplan and Zingales (1997), we construct a general index of financing constraints (the KZ index).
22 Kaplan and Zingales (1997) classify firms into discrete categories of financial constraint and then use the ordered logit regression to relate their classifications to accounting variables. The KZ index is higher for firms that are more constrained. Specifically, for each firm year, the KZ index is a linear function of five variables:
is the cash flow over lagged asset;
is the cash dividend over lagged asset;
is cash balance over lagged asset and LEV i,t is leverage and Q i,t is Tobin's Q. We calculate the KZ index for all observations and then divide the total samples into three groups according to the KZ index. Within each group, we regress investment against Tobin's Q, cash flow, two interactive variables (coverage residual * Tobin's Q and coverage residual * cash flow), industry dummies and year dummies. We apply both the OLS and Fama-MacBeth methods.
Panel A of Table 6 presents the OLS results. Interestingly, in all three sub-samples, residual*cash flow carries a significantly positive sign, which implies that more intensive analyst coverage correlates to a more sensitive investment-cash flow relationship, regardless of the degree of financing constraint. It has to be pointed out that for the group with the highest KZ index, the coefficient of residual*cash flow is the smallest (0.020 vs 0.034 in the lowest KZ index group). One possibility is that our model works better for firms with less financing constraints. Or that part of the investment cash flow sensitivity is driven by the financing constraint facing a firm. However, the effect becomes weaker when applying the Fama-MacBeth method (as reported in Panel B of Table 6 ). For example, the residual*cash flow coefficients in the low KZ index group and the high KZ index are 0.034 vs. 0.029.
Moreover, it is 0.027 vesus 0.029 for the medium KZ index and high KZ index groups.
The difference across different KZ index groups is not that significant. Clearly, our model adds one additional determinant in the investment-cash flow relationship that has not been captured by the "financing constraint" theory.
overlapping role of cash flow and stock prices
Cash flow plays an information role in our model through stock prices. One thing that is worth pointing out is that ρ in equation (11) is not the same thing as the regression coefficient on cash flow in standard linear investment regressions where various versions of Tobin's Q are also included. Nonetheless, cash flow and Tobin's Q play an overlapping role in our model since both capture information on a firm's growth opportunities and future earning prospects. Including the two correlated variables in the investment regressions, as both we and the majority of literature do, though problematic, would generate results biased against our hypothesis. Therefore, we believe the favorable empirical results we have obtained so far provide strong support for our model.
One concern about our empirical design is that the results may be driven by measurement error in Tobin's Q. However, as our model shows, even we come up with a perfect measure for Tobin's Q and include it in the investment regression, cash flow will still enter the regression significantly. Also, our empirical results show that the sensitivity of investment to Tobin's Q also increases with the residual analyst coverage. It is exactly the prediction of our model -more informative stock price leads to more responsive investment. Plus, if our results are driven by measurement error in Tobin's Q, the identified pattern in investment-cash flow sensitivity should disappear once we take Tobin's Q out of the baseline model and only include cash flow-related variables. However, it is not the case. As a matter of fact, all of our results regarding cash hold and our story becomes even more significant. 
Do analysts produce information or monitor managers?
The empirical results rely heavily on the role played by financial analysts in transmitting information from the stock market to the manager. Doukas, Kim and Pantzalis (2000) argue that the main role played by security analysts is to monitor the manager and reduce the possible conflicts of interest between the shareholders and the manager. If this view is true, we should expect lower investment-cash flow sensitivities for firms with more intense analyst scrutiny, since such scrutiny will force the managers to discipline themselves and not overspend. Our empirical results however, show the opposite. Seemingly, analysts mainly work as the medium of information transmission and aggregation.
time-series evidence
If the sensitivity of investment to cash flow is indeed due to information contained in cash flow, we expect the same results should also hold across time. That is, as a firm's stock prices become more informative over time, its investment dependence on cash flow should also increase. We set off to test this hypothesis in Table 7 . We first focus on the firm-year observations without analyst following in year t-1 but with at least one analyst following in year t. These firms' stock prices have become more informative in year t since financial analysts start to follow them and actively aggregate information. The first row of Table   7 reports the results. In year t-1, in which none of the firms has analyst following, the coefficients of cash flow and Tobin's Q are 0.111 and 0.061, respectively. In year t, after the firms have been covered by financial analysts, the coefficients of cash flow and Tobin's Q increase to 0.201 and 0.033, respectively. The coefficient of cash flow increases dramatically after the firm is covered by informed traders, which is again consistent with our model's implication.
24
To further test the hypothesis, we study another sub-sample in which the number of analysts following has increased from year t-1 to year t. We repeat the same regressions and find that for this sub-sample, the coefficient of cash flow also increases from year t-1 to year t (from 0.159 to 0.170). The results are reported in the second row of Table 7 .
Lastly, we focus on another sub-sample in which the number of analysts following has decreased from year t-1 to year t. The regression results are reported in the third row of Table 7 . Inconsistent with our model, we find that the coefficient of cash flow increases slightly (from 0.150 to 0.151). The increase is not significant though. Overall, the time-series evidence provides further support for our model.
summary and conclusion
A great deal of research has been devoted to understanding why cash flow enters the investment function significantly. The traditional view, proposed by Fazzari, Hubbard, and Petersen (1988) , emphasizes the financing constraints faced by the firms. The alternative view disputes the financing constraint argument but fails to offer a satisfactory theory to explain the well-documented investment-cash flow sensitivities.
In this paper, we use a simple information-based model of corporate investment to develop a specific, testable information transmission channel. By explicitly assuming that the cash flow carries information about the firm's investment potential, our model clearly shows that the investment-cash flow sensitivity is stronger for firms with more informative stock prices, higher cash flow volatility and smaller divergence in opinion among the informed traders.
Our model offers a market microstructure-based explanation on the investment-cash flow sensitivity other than the popular "financing constraint" hypothesis. It articulates the impact of another form of capital market inefficiency on corporate investment: inefficient stock prices provide insufficient information for the firm manager to make efficient investment decisions, which leads to less sensitive investment cash flow dependence.
We test the model using the financial analyst coverage information. Our main empirical result is that the firms with more analysts following tend to have more sensitive investmentcash flow dependence. We also find support for several other implications of the model. For example, the investment-cash flow sensitivities increase with the cash flow volatility or stock return volatility; and the investment cash flow sensitivities decrease with financial analysts' forecast standard deviation. Clearly, these results distinguish our paper from the ones with a focus on financing constraints or the ones with a focus on other forms of market inefficiency.
They also lend support to the argument that the major role of financial analysts is to generate information, not to monitor the firm manager. As we explain earlier, if analysts' major task is to monitor the manager, then we should observe a negative relation between the extent of analyst coverage and investment-cash flow sensitivities. To the best of our knowledge, the paper is the first one that places the investment-cash flow dependence issue under a market microstructure context. It adds one additional determinant in the well-documented investment-cash flow sensitivities.
Since we find stock trading and information generating activities have such a significant impact on corporate investment, it would be interesting to study whether they have a similar real impact on firm's other decisions such as dividend payout decisions, risk management decisions and so on. Also, it would be interesting to see whether investment-cash flow sensitivities would display certain cross-country patterns considering that there is a huge cross-country difference in stock market microstructure, and information transparency. We plan to tackle these issues in future research.
Table 1 Summary Statistics
The table provides summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical study.
Panel A: Summary Statistics of Capital expenditure, Tobin's Q and CashFlow
The panel presents descriptive statistics for capital expenditure, Tobin's Q and cash flow during the period from 1985 to 2001. The data source is the Compustat Annual Files. In our sample, we exclude the firms in financial industry (with SIC code between 6000 and 6999). We obtain 53,904 firm year observations. CPEX t is the firm's total capital expenditures in year t (data 128). K t-1 is the value of net property, plant, and equipment in year t-1 (data 8) . Tobin's Q is defined as the market value of asset divided by the book value of assets (data 6), where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets plus the market value of common equity less the book value of common equity (data 60) and balance sheet deferred taxes (data 74). Cash flow of a firm, CF t , is defined as the sum of earning before extraordinary (data 18) and depreciation (data 14). We truncate the sample at 1% and 99% levels to exclude outliers with extreme values in cash flow, Tobin's Q and capital expenditure. 1985 Tobin's Q and capital expenditure. -2001 Tobin's Q and capital expenditure. 1985 Tobin's Q and capital expenditure. -1990 Tobin's Q and capital expenditure. 1991 Tobin's Q and capital expenditure. -1995 Tobin's Q and capital expenditure. 1996 We sort the firm year observations according to whether the number of analysts following increase or not across time. We then compare the regression results using data in year t with those of using data in year t-1. We first choose the firm-year observations that have at least one analyst following in year t, but no coverage in year t-1.The results are reported in row (I). We then choose firm-year observations that have more analysts following in year t than in year t-1. The results are reported in row (II). Lastly, we choose the observations that have fewer analysts following in year t than in previous year. Row (III) reports the results. For each group, the first row displays the estimates using the data in year t-1; the second row reports the estimates using data in year t. Heteroscedasticconsistent standard errors are used to calculated t-statistics. t-statistics are in the parentheses. Asterisks denote the level of statistical significance for each estimator: *** 1%, ** 5%, and * 10%. 
